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has been conferred on the owners, so
that ex aquo et bono they ought to pay for
such a benefit: 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 291;
Jeremy Eq. Jur. 86 ; Percy v. Millandon, 18 Martin 616 ; 2 Story Eq. Jur.
1236; Coffin v. Heath, 6 Met. 80,
WILDE, J.
2. The other point involved in the principal case is equally clear, that one tenant
in common cannot ordinarily recover at
law for the rent, or for the use and occupation of the whole premises by the other
co-tenant, in the absence of any agreement, express or implied, that he would
pay for such exclusive use; and on the
familiar principle that each tenant in
common owns the estate per mi et per
tout ; and if one co-tenant does not see
fit to come in and occupy, the other still
has the right to the enjoyment of the
estate ; and in such cases the sole occupation by one is not an exclusion of the
other: Sargent v. Parsons, 12 Mass. 150 ;
Wilbur v., Wilbur, 13 Met. 404. See
also Norris v. Gould, 15 W. N. C. 187.

And this rule holds not only between
the tenants in common themselves, hut as
to others holding under them. Therefore if one tenant in common leases "his
interest" to a third person, and the latter enters under his lease, and occupies
the whole premises, but does nothing to
exclude the other co-tenant, and does not
attorn to him in any way, and the latter
makes no claim to be admitted into possession, he cannot recover anything of
the defendant for use and occupation of
the whole: Badgerv. Holines, 8 Grayll8.
But this does not militate with the decision in the principal case; since from
the peculiar facts it was apparent the
defendant was holding as tenant under
his lease, and not in his subsequent capacity as tenant in common ; whereas if he
had lawfully surrendered his lease, and
claimed to keep possession as tenant in
common, probably a different result
would have been reached.
EDMUND H. BxNETT.
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When payment of the purchase-money and the delivery of the goods are expressly or impliedly agreed to be simultaneous, and the payment is omitted or
refused by the purchaser upon getting possession of the goods, the vendor may
reclaim them, the delivery being merely conditional. To constitute a conditional
delivery, it is not necessary that the vendor should declare the conditions in express terms at the time of delivery. It is sufficient if it can be inferred from
the acts of the parties and the circumstances of the case that it was intended to
be conditional.
A delivery on a sale for cash is not necessarily a conditional one, for the vendor
may waive the conditions. Whether there has been such a waiver is a question
,of fact, viz.: Has the vendor voluntarily and unconditionally delivered the goods
without intending to claim the benefit of the condition, that the purchase-money
must be paid before the gtods pass to the vendee.
To constitute an executed contract of either sale, pledge or mortgage of goods,
some specific property must be appropriatedto the contract. Until this is done,
the contract is merely executory, and no property passes to the vendee, pledgee or
mortgagee.
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Semble, where a party delivers or deposits grain with another,
expressed or implied, that the latter may use and dispose of it,
tions .to the former by returning an equal amount of other
quality, the transaction, in the absence of a statute changing
a sale, and not a bailment.
APPEAL

with an agreement,
and fulfil his obligagrain of the same
the rule, constitutes

from a judgment of the District Court, Olmsted county.

Lloytd Barber, . C. Wilson and Thomas Wilson, for appellants.
A. L. Gove, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MITCHELL, J.-When nothing is said in a contract for the sale
of goods as to the time of payment, the law presumes that the sale
is for cash. Upon a sale for cash, payment and delivery are concurrent and mutually dependent acts. Neither party is bound to
perform without contemporaneous performance by the other. Where
payment of the purchase-money, or giving security for its payment
and the delivery of the goods, are expressly or impliedly agreed
to be simultaneous, and the payment or security is omitted, evaded,
or refused by the purchaser, upon getting possession of the goods,
the seller'may immediately reclaim them; the title in such case not
passing to the purchaser, the delivery being merely conditional, and
the purchaser taking simply as trustee for the seller until the condition is performed. But where there is a condition made at the
contract of sale favorable to the vendor, and solely for his benefit,
he may, if he choose, waive it. Hence a conditional sale may become an absolute one by an unconditional delivery of the goods to
the purchaser. By an unconditional delivery the title of the goods
passes to the vendee. A cash sale is not necessarily a conditional
sale. It is as competent for the vendor to waive the condition of
payment cncurrently with delivery, as any othei" condition in his
favor: Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422. To constitute a
conditional delivery, it is not necessary that the vendor should
declare the conditions in express terms at the time of the delivery.
It is sufficient if the intent of the parties that the delivery is conditional can be inferred from their acts and the circumstances of
the case. Hence, after a conditional sale has been made, and a delivery has taken place upon the expectation that the purchasemoney will be shortly paid, or the contemplated security given,
the delivery would ordinarily be conditional without any express
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declaration to that effect, because there is an implied understanding that the vendee will act honestly, and that he takes the goods
subject to the contract. Therefore a sale does not, ipso fdcto,
become absolute when a delivery is made, unaccompanied by any
Any such rule would
express declaration that it is conditional.
be unreasonable, and greatly embarrass sales. 2 Kent 297; Leven
v. Smith, 1 Denio 571; Smith v. Dennie, 6 Pick. 262.
But the doctrine is uniform and well established that if the vendor unqualifiedly and unconditionally delivers the goods to the
vendee without insisting on performance of conditions, intending to
rely solely on the personal responsibility of the vendee, the title
passes to the latter, and the vendor cannot afterwards reclaim the
property, even if the condition is never performed. His only remedy is upon the contract for the purchase-money: 2 Kent 296 ;
Benjamin on Sales, § 320, note d; Carletonv. Sumner, 4 Pick. 516;
Smith v. -Dennie,supra; -DresserMan. Co. v. Waterston, 8 Met.
9; _Farlow v. Ellis, 15 Gray 229: Goodwin v. Boston & L. B.
Co., III Mass. 487; Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Id. 422; Haskins
v. Warren, 115 Id. 514; Freeman v. Nich~ols, 116 Id. 809;
Bowen v. Burk, 13 Penn. St. 146 ; Mixer v. Cook, 81 Me. 340.
The weight of authority seems to be that a delivery, apparently
unrestricted and unconditional, of goods sold for cash, is presumptive
evidence of the waiver of the condition that payment should be
made on delivery in order to vest the title in the purchaser. Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422; Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton
Mills, 111 Id. 446; Hammett v. Linneman, 48 N. Y. 399;
Smith v. L.4'nes, 1 Seld. 43; Parlow v. Smith, supra. No secret
or undisclosed intent of the seller is of itself sufficient to make the
delivery conditional. This is not enough to make the purchaser a
trustee of the vendor. Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton Mills, supra.
Waiver id a voluntary relinquishment of some right, which, but for
Hence voluntary
such waiver, the party would have enjoyed.
choice is of the essence of waiver, and not mere negligence, though
from such negligence, itnexplained, such intention may be inferred.
Hence the important question, in determining whether there has
been a waiver of a condition of sale, is: Has the vendor manifested
by his language or conduct, an intention or willingness to waive the
condition, and make the delivery unconditional and the sale absolute
without having received payment or the performance of the conditions
of sale ? This must depend on the intent of the parties at the time,
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to be ascertained from their conduct and language, and not from the
mere fact of delivery alone. Whether there has been a waiver is a
question of fact. It may be proved by various species of evidence:
by declarations, by acts, or by forbearance to act. But, however
proved, the question is: Has the vendor voluntarily and unconditionally delivered the goods without intending to claim the benefit
of the condition? Fuller v. Bean, 34 N. H. 290-303; Smith v.
Dennie, supra; .arlow v. Ellis, supra; Hammett v. Linneman,
supra.
In the case at bar, the court has found that the sale by Van
Dusen & Co. to Cole was for cash; but he also finds that all the
wheat delivered to Cole was so delivered to him absolutely, without
insisting upon payment at the time of delivery, no condition, expressed or implied, being annexed to the delivery. If this is justified by the evidence, it is, under the rules of law already announced, conclusive against the right of Van Dusen & Co. to reclaim
the wheat because of non-payment of the purchase-money.
We shall not attempt to state the evidence. The substance of it
is very fairly and succinctly stated in the findings of fact by the
trial court.
The contract between the parties not having been in writing, and
Cole being dead, the evidence was, necessarily, mostly circumstantial, consisting largely of facts showing the course of dealing between the parties in reference to this and numerous other prior and
similar transactions. Payment had never been insisted upon at .the
time of delivery. The delivery of grain in this, as well as former
deals, was apparently unrestricted and unconditional : at least, it
was never accompanied by any express declaration that it was conditional. According to the usual course of dealing between the
parties, it appears that while Van Dusen & Co were accustomed to
send Cole their bills from time to time, as one or more car-loads
were delivered, yet immediate payment was never insisted uponCole paying in whole or in part, from time to time, as was convenient; sometimes within a day or two, sometimes not for weeks or
even monthg after the delivery of the grain.
The evidence shows that Cole bought wheat exclusively to be
ground in his mill. It also tends to show that he never kept it
separate from other wheat until paid for, and that he was accustomed
to use it by grinding it up at any time after delivery without reference to whether he had paid for it or not. From the situation of the
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parties it is almost impossible that Van Dusen & Co. were not fully
aware of this mode of dealing with the wheat by Cole. In fact
the evidence tends strongly to prove that they perfectly understood
it. Cole's standing was good, and it appears that Van Dusen & Co. had
entire confidence in his personal responsibility. Such a state of facts
amply sustains the finding of the court to the effect that the delivery
of the grain to Cole was absolute and unconditional, and was intended
to be such, and that Van Dusen & Co. had no expectation of asserting the condition of payment before the title should pass, but,
on the contrary, relied solely upon the vendee's personal responsibility. Van Dusen & Co. also contend earnestly that the sale
and delivery of the whole 12,000 bushels was an entirety, and the
payment also to be an entirety upon the delivery of the whole, and
therefore that the delivery was not complete when Cole died, and
hence there could have been no waiver of conditions as to the part delivered. This theory of the transaction is entirely at variance with
the course of dealing between the parties, both in reference to this
and prior sales. While it is true that the bargain for the purchase
of the 12,000 bushels was a single contract, yet it was evidently
the understanding of the parties that it was to be delivered in instalments of one or more car-loads, the purchase-money for which
was payable at any time on demand after delivery, without reference to whether the whole amount contracted for had or had not
been delivered. It was precisely on this theory that Van Dusen &
Co. acted in reference to this very transaction, for if their present
theory be correct there was nothing due until the whole 12,000
bushels was delivered. The grain being thus deliverable, and to
be paid for in instalments, the delivery of each instalment was just
as complete as if no more remained to be delivered. The evidence
fully warranted the court in finding that the wheat was to be delivered and paid for in car-load lots, as it should arrive from the
several warehouses of the vendors. And this finding is fairly
within the issues made by the pleadings.
This brings us to the consideration of the claims of the defendant banks. The facts as found by the court are as follows; Cole
was a miller operating a flouring-mill, and engaged in purchasing
wheat and manufacturing it into flour, and shipping and selling the
same. He was not a general warehouseman, and had no warehouse except an elevator, which was a part of his mill. His principal and exclusive business was that of miller, although, as an
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incident to that business, he was accustomed to receive into his mill
from farmers, for storage, wheat, until such time as they desired to
sell it, issuing to them therefor the usual storage or warehouse
tickets. In 1880 twenty-five persons so stored wheat with him;
in 1881, twenty-one; in 1882, four; in 1883, two. He never
sold, delivered, or shipped wheat out of his mill, or redelivered any
wheat left with him for storage, but all wheat thus received into his
mill he ground up, using it as a part of his current stock in his
business of milling. In April 1882, he borrowed $5000 from the
First National Bank of Winona, for which he gave his note, and at
the same time executed and delivered to the bank the following instrument : "Received in store, for account of First National Bank
of Winona, 5000 bushels of No. 2 wheat, deliverable to them or
their order on return of this receipt: provided, always, that if a
certain note, bearing even date, and due July 9, 1882, for $5000,
shall have been paid, this receipt is null and void, otherwise in full
force." In May 1882, he had a precisely similar transaction with
the Second National Bank, except that the loan was $3000, and the
instrument in the form of a receipt which he gave, did not contain
the proviso contained in the other. Neither loan was ever paid.
These instruments were, and by all parties were intended to be
collateral security for the repayment of these loans, and for no other
purpose. Otherwise than as above stated, Cole never sold any wheat
to these banks, nor did the banks ever store any wheat with him, or
ever deliver any wheat to him, and never had any wheat in his possession. Between August 2 and 8, 1882, the mill was entirely
cleaned out of wheat, so that on the 8th of August there was no
wheat of any kind in the mill that bad been placed there prior to
to that date, the whole having been ground into flour in the usual
course of operating the mill.
The court does not find, and there was no evidence tending to
prove, that there was any wheat in the mill at the date of either
of these transactions with the banks. The wheat found in the mill
.at Cole's death, which is the wheat here in controversy, was purchased by him from defendants, Van Dusen & Co., and others, subsequent to August 8th 1883. It seems to us that to state these
facts is to prove that the banks cannot maintain their claim to this
wheat. The act of 1876, commonly known .as the "Warehouse
Act," (Gen. Laws 1876, c. 86, or Gen. St. 1878, p. 1012), has no
application to such",transactions,. The banks never actually deliv-
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ered any wheat to Cole for storage. They never bought any wheat
of him, and he never sold them any. All that can be possibly
claimed is that he executed these receipts for the purpose of pledging or mortgaging his own wheat to the banks as security for his
own debt. Now the act above cited, as its title and contents clearly
indicate, was designed to protect the rights of actual depositorsthose who deliver grain to another for storage. The act is too long
to quote in extenso, but its language throughout shows that this
was its exclusive scope and purpose. The very first expression in
the first section furnishes the key to the whole act, viz. : " Whenever any grain shall be delivered for storage." Such expressions
as "whenever any grain shall be deposited," "the person so storing," "the amount of grain so stored," "the terms of storage,"
"charges for storage," and like expressions, are to be found all
through the act. But aside from the strict letter of the act, its
provisions as a whole, the evil sought to be removed, and the remedy
sought to be applied, clearly show that it was never in the legislative mind that it should apply to transactions where there was in
fact no deposit of grain for storage, but simply an attempt by a
party to pledge or mortgage his own property in his own possession
to secure his debt. To extend its application to such transactions
would practically result in important modifications of the law of
pledges and mortgages of personal property,-a thing not to be
presumed to have been contemplated by the legislature. We do
not mean to say that a vendor may not become the bailee of the
vendee, so as to bring the transaction within the statute. It might
with force be claimed that there would be no substantial reason for
requiring the parties in such a case to go through two ceremonial
deliveries. But that is not this case. To bring a case within the
provisions of this statute there must be a delivery by an actual
depositor. See Greenleaf v. Dows, 8 Fed. Rep. 550; Adams v.
Merchants' Bank, 2 Fed. Rep. 174.
Therefore, in our judgment, this statute has no application to
the present case, and hence the rights of the banks must be determined according to common-law principles alone. If these transactions amounted to anything, it was either as a pledge or a mortgage. For the purposes of this case it is immaterial which it be
called. One of the counsel for the banks avoids stating which of
the two he claims to be. The attorney of record claims it was a
pledge. We are inclined to think it was an attempt to create a
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pledge; and as that is the view most favorable to the banks, we
shall consider the case from that standpoint.
We shall assume (without deciding the question) that a warehouseman, having property of his own in his warehouse, may pledge
it as security for his own debt by merely issuing to his creditor an
instrument in the .form of a warehouse receipt. This is,certainly,
as far as any authority goes. We will also assume that Cole was,
within the meaning of the authorities, a "warehouseman," which
we very much doubt. But conceding these, still there never
was any executed contract of pledge, because no specific property
was ever appropriated to the contract so as to pass title to the
pledgee.
It is an elementary principle of law, applicable alike to sales,
mortgages and pledges, that the contract becomes executed only by
specifying the goods to which it is to attach; or, in legal phrase,
by the appropriationof the specific goods to the contract. Until
this is done the contract is executory, and the property does not
pass. There was no such appropriation of any specific grain to
these contracts, even under what may be termed the modern American doctrine, that where the mass, from which the sale, mortgage
or pledge is made, is uniform in character and quality, as wheat
in an elevator, separation from the mass is not necessary to constitute an appropriation of the property to the contract. But in
this case, out of what mass was this wheat to be taken ? There is
no evidence that there was any wheat in the mill when these receipts
were executed, and if there was, there is nothing to show that it
was the wheat referred to. So far as appears, the banks might
with equal propriety claim any other wheat situated elsewhere. But
even if it be further conceded that there was, at the dates referred
to, wheat in the mill, and that this was the wheat referred to in the
receipts, yet there is still a conclusive reason why the banks cannot
recover. As found by the court, Cole was accustomed to use all
the wheat in his mill as a part of his stock in the milling
busihess, grinding it into flour, which he shipped and sold.
This appears' to have been his usual and long-continued practice. In view of this fact, and also the well-understood usages
of the grain trade as to the time within which it is ordinarily
marketed, it could never have been in the contemplation of the parties that Cole would keep this wheat on hand from the spring of
1882 until the late summer of 1883. The banks must have underVOL. XXXIII.-65
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stood tha. Cole would, and tacitly assented that he might, use and
grind up this wheat, and ship and sell the flour. The most that
can be claimed for the transaction is that he was, on demand, to
deliver to the banks out of his stock an amount of wheat corresponding in quantity and grade to that named in the receipts. Even
if they had actually deposited their own wheat with Cole, under such
circumstances, it hardly needs the citation of authorities at this
day to the proposition that it would have, in the absence of a statute, constituted a sale and not a bailment. The very object of the
statute already considered was to change the rule in this regard as
to actual depositors. See Bahilly's Case, 3 Dill 420; Chase v.
Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244; South Australian_ns. Co.v. Bandell,
L. R., 3 P. C. App. 101.
No case to which we have been referred goes far enough to support the claim of the banks on the facts of this case. In almost
all of them we think it will be found that not only was specific property appropriated to the contract, but the identity of the subject
of the pledge was preserved. Merchants' Bank v. Bibbard, 48
Mich. 118, which takes quite advanced positions on some questions,
comes nearer supporting the claim of the defendants than any case
we have found. But the identity of the property pledged with
that claimed seems to have been assumed or taken for granted.
On no other theory, we think, could the result in that case have
been reached. In the case at bar, all wheat in the mill had been
removed between August 2d and 8th, and the wheat in dispute purchased by Cole subsequent to the latter date. Our conclusion is
that the banks have no title to the wheat, and have no right to
any preference over other creditors of the estate in the distribution
of its proceeds.
Judgment affirmed.
The principles stated in the opening
sentences of the opinion, that the law
presumes a sale to be for cash when
nothing is said to the contrary, and that
upon a sale for cash, payment and delivery are concurrent and mutually dependent acts, are well recognised.
But the
condition of payment may be waived. In
Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422,
428, the trial judge instructed the jury,
" that a cash sale might or might not be
a conditional sale ; that it was not necessarily in law either a conditional or an

unconditional sale ; and that it was for
the jury to determine upon the evidence
whether the sale was conditional or not. '"
This ruling was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the state, as applied to the facts
of the case, in which the sale was accompanied by a delivery. Such language is
confusing.
When a sale is made for
cash, the right to demand the money immediately upon delivery, and to reclaim
the goods if the money be not forthcoming, always exists; but, of course, if
delivery is voluntarily made without pay-
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mcnt being insisted on, and without being
induced by artifice or fraud, the condition
is waived.
If the terms are "cash in ten days"
it is evident that payment is not expected
to be concurrent with delivery, and upon
an absolute delivery there is no right to
reclaim the goods if the payment be not
made at the expiration of the ten days:
Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514.
It is very necessary to distinguish sales
for cash from sales on condition that the
title shall not pass until the price is paid.
In many of the states such conditional
sales are recognised and held valid even
as to innocent third parties, while in
others they are held void as to creditors
of the vendee and bona fide purchasers
from him. See Lewis v. McCabe, 21
Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 217, and note.
The law in regard to cash sales seems to
be universal. And it is evident that the
vendor, in the case of a cash sale, who
has made a contract entitling him to payment as soon as his goods are delivered,
should not be allowed, after waiving the
condition of immediate payment, and
trustir.g for his money to the personal
credit of the vendee, no matter how soon
his mistake is discovered, to turn around
and contend that he made the delivery on
condition that the title would not pass
until the price was paid ; even though
the law of the state in which the transaction occurred would have permitted
him to make such a contract instead of
the contract he did make. See the dissenting opinion in Hanimettv. Linneman,
48 N. Y. 406. But it is of course possible that upon the vendor coming to the
vendee in the case of a cash sale and
learning that payment will not follow delivery, the contract between them may
be abandoned, either expressly or by implication, and another entered into by
which delivery is to be made at once, but
the title is not to pass until payment of
the price. See Nash v. Weaver, 23 Hun
516.
Many cases on this subject are collected

in note (d) to sect. 320 of the Fourth
American ed. of Benjamin on Sales.
See also Evansville, 4-c., Bfd. Co. V. irwin, 84 Ind. 457.
On the question of the necessity of
separation in the case of a sale of a portion of a homogeneous mass, a late case
in New Jersey, which was difierently
decided by the Supreme Court and the
Court of Errors and Appeals, was reported each time in the pages of this
magazine, and each time with a note
opposed to the decision: Hires v. Hurif,
17 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) I1,and Hurff
v. Hires, 18 Id. 161. The recent date
of these discussions and their fulness,
render it unnecessary to take up here
that general question.
In the principal case the question was
as to the pledge, by means of what purported to be a warehouse receipt, of a
portion of a mass, of uniform character
and quality, by the owner, a miller, and
it was decided that his retained power
over the wheat in question was so extensive as to be inconsistent with there
having been any pledge of it.
Under the facts of the case probably
no fault will be found with the decision,
although it may be said that it might
preferably have been put on the ground
that Cole was not a "warehouseman ;"
Cole's-course of business was such that
his depositors could not have considered
him under any obligation to keep on
hand wheat of such kind and quantity as
to answer all his outstanding receipts,
and therefore a ,deposit with him must
be looked upon as a sale and not a bailment; but so far as the opinion states
or implies that the right of the warehouseman to substitute for the wheat deposited, wheat of like quality, keeping
on band always the requisite quantity,
will make the transaction a sale and not
a bailment, it is not in accordance with
what would seem to be the better doctrine. See the elaborate note of Mr. (now
Judge) HoLuns, to Chase v. Washburn,
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6 Am. L. Rev. 450: Sexton 4- Abbott
v. Graham et al., 53 Iowa 181 ; Ntelson
Y; Brown et al., Id. 555.
Some of the cases while admitting the
power of an owner to sell his own goods,
without segregation and without actual
delivery, deny him the power to so
pledqe them ; it is proposed in this note
to examine a few typical cases, with a
view of determining the correctness of
this attempted distinction.
Gibson v. Stevens, 8 Howard 384
(1850), a part of the syllabus of which
is as follows :"Where personal property is, from its character or situation
at the time of the sale, incapable of
actual delivery, the delivery of the bill
of sale, or other evidence of title, is sufficient to transfer the property and possession to the vendee.
I I Where articles of commerce were purchased in the state of Indiana, and the
vendors in whose warehouses they were
lying, gave a written memorandum of
the sale, with a receipt for the money,
and an engagement to deliver them on
board of canal-boats soon after the
opening of canal navigation, these documents transferred the property and the
possession of the articles to the purchasers.
"These documents, being endorsed
and delivered to a merchant in New
York, in consideration of advances of
money in the usual course of trade,
transferred to him the legal title and
constructive possession of the property.
an attachment subse"Therefore,
quently issued, at the instance of a
creditor of the original purchasers, which
was levied upon the property in question, could not be maintained."
Gibson, the merchant in New York,
was, by his contract, to sell the stuff,
repay himself and turn over the balance,
less commissions and charges, to the
original purchasers, McQneen & McKay.
TANEY, C. J., says: "Nor, as respects the legal title, can there he -any
distinction between the advance made

by Gibson, and the case of an actual
purchaser. To the extent of his advances he is a purchaser, and the legal
title was conveyed to him to protect his
advances. * * * The legal title, the
right of property, passed to him, and
McQueen & McKay retained nothing
but an equitable interest in the surplus,
if any remained after satisfying the
claim of Gibson."
It was not denied that the equitable
interest of McQueen & McKay was
liable to attachment, but the decision
was that Gibson was entitled to the possession of the goods. The goods were
in the warehouses of third persons.
It is submitted that this case, properly
understood, is a decision recognising
the validity of a pledge of merchandise
by a symbolical delivery thereof by
means of the transfer of a warehouse
receipt.
To show the nature of the transaction
when there is such a symbolical delivery
of property in pledge, the following extract from the opinion of BRADLEY, J.,
in Casey v. Cavaroc, 6 Otto 467 (1877),
is of interest: "The difference ordinarily recognised between a mortgage
and a pledge is, that title is transferred
by the former, and possession by the
latter. * * * The possession need not
be actual: it may be constructive; as
where the key of a warehouse containing
the goods pledged is delivered, or a bill
of lading is assigned. In such case the
act done will be considered as a token,
standing for actual delivery of the goods.
It puts the property under the power
and control of the creditor. In such
cases, such constructive delivery cannot
be effected without doing what amounts
to a transfer of the property also. The
assignment of a bill of lading is of that
kind. Such an assignment is necessary,
where a pledge is proposed, in order to
give the constructive possession required
to constitute a pledge; and yet it formally transfers the title also. In such a
case there is a union of two distinct
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forms of security-that of mortgage and
that of pledge; mortgage by virtue of
the title, and pledge by virtue of the
possession."
In Yenni v. McNamee, 45 N. Y. 614,
(1871), S. was the owner and in possession of a quantity of petroleum at his
factory. His superintendent signed and
delivered to him the following receipt,
dated Dec. 6th 1866: "Received on
storage for account of S., 600 barrels of
petroleum, crude and refined, contained
in tanks, and 700 barrels to hold the
same; deliverable to his order on payment of the charge named therein, in accordance with the marginal note hereto.
."
per month. Labor,
Storage,
The receipt was not for any designated
or separate parcel of oil, but was intended
to cover oil, crude, refined or in process
of refining in the works, and empty barrels to hold it. , On the 16th of Dec. the
Ocean Bank loaned Stokes $5000 and
received his note therefor and, as collateral security, took the receipt above set
out, endorsed by him. There was no
change of possession of the oil ; none of
it was set apart to answer the call of this
receipt ; and no one, on behalf of the
bank, ever saw the oil. An execution
was issued against Stokes and the sheriff
the defendant in this case, levied on all
tbe oil, barrels, &c., in the works.
Stokes was authorized by the bank to
sell the oil covered by the receipt, on their
account, and, after the levy, sold
and delivered the oil in question,
which the sheriff reclaimed, and to recover which this action was brought.
GnovEa, J., says : "The inquiry is,
did the bank acquire an absolute title to
time property by the endorsement of the
receipt to it by Stokes, so that it was not
thereafter liable to be levied upon and
sold upon an execution against him.* * *
There is no doubt but that Stokes intended to confer some title to the property
by indorsing and delivering the receipt
to it ; and the bank, by accepting it, intended to acquire an interest in tbe pro-

perty.

Although the mode adopted was

informal it was, I think, effectual to accomplish the object of the parties. A
transfer ofa warehouse receipt by indorsement, with intent to transfer the title to
the property specified therein, is effectual
under the law merchant, independent of
the statute, to transfer the title: [ Gibson v.
Stevens, 8 How. U. S. Rep. ] Had Stokes,
therefore, indorsed and delivered the
receipt to the bank in good faith, upon
an absolute sale of the property to the
bank, I am not prepared to say that the
bank would not thereby have acquired
the title, although the receipt was a mere
fiction between Stokes and Chapman.
Both of the latter would have been estopped from denying that the receipt was
based upon a real transaction. This estoppel would have been equally effectual
against all claiming under Stokes upon a
title subsequently acquired. * * * But
Stokes transferred the receipt, and, therefore, the title to the property, as a mere security for the payment of his note. It
was therefore a mere mortgage security,"
and void as against creditors, because notaccompanied by immediate delivery, or
filed as required by the state statute.
See to same effect Farmers 4- fechanics'
National Bank v. Lang, 87 N.Y. 209,
(1881).
(See, however, Parshall v.
Eg.qert, 54 N. Y. 18). Adams, Assignee, 6-c. v. Merchants' NationalBank,
2 Fed. Rep. 174, and 19 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 714, opinion by D.RUMMOND,
J., is a very similar case.
In Smn th v. Craig, (1841) 3 W. & S.
14, S., the defendant, bought and received
from C., B. & Co. flour, to be paid for
half in cash and half in 60-day notes.
Being pressed for payment he consented
to let molasses in his distillery stand
either as their property or as collateral
security on condition that they would take
his notes at 60 and 90 days, in lieu of
the former terms. He pointed out the
molasses, consisting of 400 hogsheads,
to be ascertained by counting them off,
in rows, from a particular place, and in
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a particular manner. He agreed that the
molasses should remain in his yard, and
to send them the rum to be distilled from
the molasses, to be sold by them and applied to his debt. GiBsoN, C. J. : "Had
it rested there, the plaintiff, or the firm
he represents, could not have recovered
as in the case of a pawn : for at this time
there was no delivery of possession, and
consequently no pawn. Indeed, retention
of possession was necessarily a part of
the arrangement, because it was indispensable to enable the defendant to carry
the other parts of it into effect."
Merchants', '-c., Bank v. Hibbard,
(1882) 48 Mich. 118. In this case there
was issued by the defendants as security
for a loan of $20,000 made to them by the
bank, the plaintiff, the following warehouse receipt: "Received, Grand Rapids, Michigan, January 17, 1880, in
store for account of the Merchants' and
Manufacturers' National Bank of Detroit, Michigan,
eighteen thousand
(18,000) bushels No. I white and 2 red
winter wheat, to be delivered in wheat
or its equivalent in flour upon return of
this receipt properly endorsed, to be kept
insured for account of whom it may concern.
HI3BARP & GPAFp."
H. & G. were not only buying, storing, manufacturing, shipping and selling
wheat on their own account, but were
also receiving into their mills wheat to be
stored for others, for which they issued
the customary warehouse receipt. The
firm of Hibbard & Graff failed in March
1880, and the bank sued out this writ of
replevin. CooLEY, J., says," The defendants do not deny that title may pass by the
delivery of a warehouse receipt in pursuance of an actual sale, nor, as we understand it, do they dispute that when
one is owner of property represented by
a warehouse receipt or other instrument
of a similar nature, he may make pledge
of it and transfer constructive possession
by delivering to the pledgee the instrument that represents his property. * * *
But in this case the plaintiff never had

either title or actual possession of the property; it was not intended that the warehouse receipt should pass the title to the
plaintiff. It is therefore contended that
there was and could be in the case no constructive possession except such as might
be implied in any case in which an
owner should undertake to pledge the
property, and at the same time without
delivery retain it in his own hands and
under his own exclusive control.
" We have already said that it is conceded a warehouseman may transfer
title to property in his warehouse by the
delivery of the customary warehouse receipt. In such cases there is no constructive delivery of the property whereby
to perfect the sale except such as is implied from the delivery of the receipt;
and where the property represented is
only part of a large mass as was the
case here, there could not well be any
other constructive delivery. But for the
convenient transaction of the commerce
of the country it has been found necessary to recognise and sanction this
method of transfer, and vast quantities
of grain are daily sold by means of such
receipts. * * * We are then to see whether a constructive transfer of possession
that is recognised in the oase of sale
shall be held inoperative in case of an
attempted pledge.
" If a distinction is made in the cases
it ought to be upon some ground that
would seem reasonable in commercial
circles. * * *

"If a merchant may buy grain in store
and receive a transfer of title in a warehouse receipt, he would be very likely if
he had occasion to receive grain in pledge,
to suppose a similar receipt to be sufficient for that purpose. No reason would
occur to him why it should be otherwise,
and this because there would be in fact
no reason except one purely technical,
depending on nice legal distinctions.
When that is found to be the case any
proposition to establish a distinction
should be rejected, decisively and with-
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out hesitation ; for the laws of trade are
made and exist for the protection and
convenience of trade, and they should not
tolerate rules which have the effect to
'border the chambers of commerce with
legal pitfalls. * * *
" Some stress was laid by the defendants upon the fact that two kinds of
wheat are mentioned in the receipt, and
there is no specification of the quantity
of each to be held. The circumstances
explain this, for they show that the two
kinds were mixed in grinding, and it
was evidently contemplated that flour
rather than wheat should be held. In
the absence of any specification of the
quantity of each kind that was to be
held, the legal construction we think
would entitle the pledgee to an equal
amount of each kind if it remained unmanufactured. The return of the officer
shows that he found no red wheat, and
but 3051 bushels of white wheat. For
the remainder he took an equivalent in
flour according to the terms of the receipt."
See also Cochran v. Ripy, 13 Bush
(Iy.) 495 ; Fergiuon, Jr., Assignee, v.
Northern Bank of Kentucky, 14 Id. 555;
Gibson v. The Bank, 11 Ohio St. 311;
Rice v. Cutler, 17 Wis. 351 ; Whitney v.
Tibbits et al., Id. 359 ; Shcpardson v.
Gary, 29 Id. 34; Nat. Bank of Green
Bay v. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219 ; Cool
v. Phillips, 66 Il1. 216 ; Taylor v. Turner, 87 Id. 296 ; Osborn v. Koenigheim,
57 Tex. 91 ; Dougherty v. Iclaggerty, 96
Penn. St. 515.
The conclusions which the writer deduces from his examination of the authorities, are, First: That while possession by
the pledgee is a necessary condition of

the existence and continuance of a pledge,
yet that that possession is not required-to
be actual physical possession. The holding of a recognised symbol of title, a bill
of lading or a warehouse receipt is sufficient. And the owner of goods, if a
warehouseman, can pledge the same by
delivering his own warehouse receipt to
the pledgee.
The qualification of'this last proposition, that the pledgor must be a warehouseman, seems to have been overlooked
in the consideration given by the judges
deciding them to some of the cases cited.
That the pledgor is a warehouseman and
the instrument, a warehouse receipt
should be shown by pleadings and proof.
Shepardson v. Gary, supra; Thorne v.
.Rrst Nat. Bank, 37 Ohio St. 254.
Second: That segregation from a
uniform mass is no more required in the
case of a pledge by means of the transfer of a warehouse receipt, than in the
case of a sale thereby. Where the
pledgor is a warehouseman, the world
has notice from that fact that the legal
possession of the goods in his warehouse
is probably in another, although the physical possession and control of them is
in himself: if he be not a warehouseman
and yet desire to pledge bulky articles
not easily susceptible of actual delivery,
he must, at least, clearly and unequivocally designate the articles pledged, so
that third persons need not be deceived.
Anderson y. Brenneman, 44 Mich. 198;
Reeder v. Machen, 57 Md. 56; Collins
v. Buck, 63 Me. 459 ; Thompson v. Dolliver, 132 Mass. 103 ; Crawfordv. Davis,
99 Penn. St. 576.
BhNldtpi H. Low.
Philadelphia.
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A statute appointing a state reporter, authorizing the secretaryof state to contract
for the publication of his reports and giving to the contractor the exclusive right to
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publish the same confers no right to copyright, nor any exclusive right to publish,
the opinions of the court.
Quere, whether the state, through its reporter, can secure a copyright in the
opinions of its judges.

IN CHANCERY. Hearing on bill and answer.
SAGE, J.-The complainants, partners under the style of "Banks
Brothers," and law-book publishers at the city of New York, are
contractors with the state of Ohio for the publication of forthcoming
volumes forty-one and forty-two, Ohio State Reports. They seek
to enjoin the defendant, who is the proprietor and publisher at Columbus, Ohio, of the "American Law Journal," -from publishing
therein any of the decisions and opinions of the judges of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, or of the Supreme Court Commission of
Ohio, in cases which are to be reported in either of said volumes.
It appears from the bill that under arrangements made with the
complainants by the proprietor of the " Ohio Law Journal" and the
"Weekly Law Bulletin," copyrighted advance publications of said
decisions are made at Columbus in supplements to those periodicals.
The copyrights are secured by the official reporter in pursuance, it
is averred, of the duties of his office, and for the benefit of the
state of Ohio, and the protection of the rights and interests of the
complainants under their said contract.
The complainants charge that the defendant has unlawfully
infringed said copyrights by republishing said decisions, and that
he has declared to them in writing his intention to continue so to do;
wherefore they pray that he may be restrained by injunction.
The respondent answers admitting the publication of the opinions
and decisions referred to in the bill, but avers that they are solely
and exclusively the productions of the judges of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, and of the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio, that the
judge to whom the duty is assigned to prepare an opinion, prepares
also the statement of the case and the-syllabus, the latter being
subject to revision by the judges concurring in the opinion ; that
the duty of the reporter is limited to preparing abstracts of arguments of counsel, tables of cases, and indexes, reading proof, and
in arranging cases in their proper order in the volumes of reports
of said courts, for all which he is paid out of the treasury of the
state a stated annual salary, fixed by the law, and that he has no
pecuniary interest in the publication of said reports. The respondent admits that he intends to continue said publications, but denies
that the reporter has any right or authority to secure a copyright
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upon the publications described in the bill, or that said copyright
waq secured ly him for the benefit of the state of Ohio or for the
protection of the rights of the complainants.
The resp)ondent :a.-o avers that complainants, for the consideration
of $600, contracted with the proprietors of the "Ohio Law Journal"
and of the " Weekly Law Bulletin" to give to them the exclusive
right to publish in said periodicals said opinions and decisions, and
to protect said pretended right by commencing and prosecuting at
their own cost such suits as might be necessary therefor, and that
therefore the complainants have no interest in the result of this
controversy.
The provisions of the statutes of Ohio bearing upon the questions involved are referred to in the bill and in the answer.
The cause came on for hearing on the bill and answer.
Sect. 437, Revised Statutes of Ohio, empowers the secretary
of state when authorized by resolution of the general assembly to
contract with any responsible person or firm to publish the reports
authorized by law, and to furnish for the use of the state the number of copies required to supply the state, at a cost, not to exceed
31.50 per volume, and the number of copies required to meet the
demands of the citizens of the state, at a cost not exceeding $1.75
per volume : also to furnish advance sheets as provided in sections
430 and 431. Sect. 437 further provides that " such contractor
shall have the sole and exclusive right to publish said reports, so
far as the state can confer the same," during the period of the contract.
Sects. 429-435 provide for the printing and binding of the volumes of reports under the direction of the supervisor of public
printing. These sections do not apply when, as in this case, the
secretary of state is authorized to make the contract as provided in
section 437.
Sect. 436 requires the reporter to secure a copyright for the use
of the state for each volume of the reports published under the provisions of sects. 429-435, but the duty of the reporter is limited to
securing a copyright "for each volume of the reports so published."
No such duty is imposed upon him with reference to volumes published under contracts made by the secretary by virtue of the provisions of sect. 437. Under that section-which applies in this
case-the sole and exclusive right to publish the reports, so far as
the state can confer the same, is granted to the contractor. Nowhere
VOL. XXXII.-66
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in the statute law relating to the publication of reports is authority
given to the reporter or to any other person to acquire a copyright
in the decisions or opinions of the judges. This is significant in
view of -the unanimous opinion of the justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 668, that
no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions
delivered by that court. The legislation in the state of Ohio must
be considered to have been enacted with reference to that opinion,
and therefore to have been intended to limit the provisions above
cited to the volumes of reports, and to exclude copyrights of the
It is in accordance with sound public
opinions of the judges.
policy, in a commonwealth where every person is presun*ed to know
the law, to regard the authoritative exposition of the law by the
regularly constituted judicial tribunals as public property, to be published freely by any one who may choose to publish them. And
such publication may be. of everything which is the work of the
judge, including the syllabus and the statement of the case, as well
as the opinion. The copyright of the volume does not interfere
with such free publication. It protects only the work of the
reporter-that is to say, the indexes, the tables of cases and the
statement of points made and authorities cited by counsel. Wheaton v. Peters,8 Pet. 653; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165 and 362;
Chase v. Sanborn, 4 Clifford 306; Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed.
Rep. 726 ; s. c. 10 Bissell 139 ; Myers v. Callaghan,20 Fed. Rep.
441.
Counsel for complainants cite Judge DRUMMOND'S dictum in
Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 728, that "if an adequate compensation was paid by the state to the reporter for the work done
by him in preparing volumes of reports, then whatever property
there was in the volumes arising from the labors of the reporter
ought to belong to the state and not to him."
" Now," says counsel, "in Ohio the state undertakes to pay the
reporter ' adequate compensation,' and by the statute that amount is
all he can receive. He has no perquisites. The theory is that the
state pays him for his labor, and that the result of his labor
belongs to the state."
And counsel proceed to claim that "this is precisely the
theory upon which the state is entitled to the decisions of the
judges. They are paid a stipulated price or sum for their services,
and this by their consent-impliedly given when they accept the
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office-is in full of their services, and the result of their labors is
the property of the state." Mr. Drone, in his work on Copyright,
page 161, states substantially the same view, although he says he
has seen no sound clear exposition of the law governing copyright
in judicial decisions, and that it has not been expressly declared in
any modern case that copyright will vest in a judicial decision. Mr.
Justice STrORY, one of the judges who concurred in the decision in
Wheaton v. Peters, said (in Gray v. Bussell, 1 Story 21), that
while it was held in that case that the opinions of the court, being
published under the authority of Congress, were not the proper
subject of copyright, it was as little doubted by the court that Mr.
Wheaton had a copyright in his own marginal notes, and in the
arguments of counsel as prepared and arranged in his work.
Whether the state, through its reporter, can secure a copyright
in the opinions of its judges is, however, not a question arising, nor
can it be decided in this case. It is sufficient to say that the state
has not adopted legislation for such copyright, that the enactments
providing for copyright for the volumes of reports, or of the reports,
do not authorize copyrights of the opinions of the judges.
The averments of the answer respecting the contract by and
between the complainants and the proprietors of the law journal at
Columbus, which with complainants' consent publish the opinions
of the judges, complainants binding themselves to protect them in
their assumed exclusive right of publication, are not material. If
the reporter had the right to secure copyright in these opinions for the
benefit of complainants the complainants had the right to make the
arrangement referred to, and it would be not only the right, but
the duty of complainants to institute suits for the protection of said
publishers in their exclusive license.
But the reporter has no such right. The statute gives him no
power, no authority or right whatever, with reference to copyright
of even the volumes included in complainants' contract.
Whatever sole and exclusive right to publish such reports the
state could confer, was by the express terms of the statute, conferred
upon the complainants. As held in Myers v. Callaghan, the reporter is entitled, in the absence of express legislation to the contrary, to copyright his volumes of reports, to the extent that the
same consist of the work of his own hand, notwithstanding he may
not have a copyright in the opinions of the court. And in this case
he might secure copyright in the volumes of reports, not for his own
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benefit, but for the benefit of complainants, but the copyrights he
has attempted to secure in the opinions of the judges are worthless.
The bill will be dismissed at complainants' costs.
The foregoing case follows the uniform line of decision in America, that no
person can have copyright in judicial
opinions. Though the point has not been
directly passed upon in any modern English case there seems no reason to doubt
that the law is now the same there as here.
Formerly, the House of Lords used to
forbid any report of State Trials, except
that authorized by itself; and it was long
a custom, no doubt arising as much from
etiquette as from law, that the author of
a book of reports should obtain the
judges' sanction to his work. (Gurney
v. Longman, 13 Vesey 493. Drone on
Copyright 159ff).
The further question, alluded to in the
principal case, whether the state which
employs the judges may claim copyright in
their judgments, has never been decided.
This right was formerly exercised in
England, but it is to be suspected, that
according to the political doctrines of the
times it was based rather on royal prerogative-similar to that by which the
printing of law-books and bibles was
confined to the king's patentees-than
on the doctrine of property in the state,
as Mr. Drone appears to think.
The authorized Law Reports of our
states are often published by an official
reporter, who takes the copyright and
makes what he can out of the book, subject to a contract to deliver so many
copies to the state free of charge, and in
the sale of the book not to exceed a
certain price per copy. Another method
is for the reporter to receive a salary, the
publishing of the reports being given out
by contract and the copyright held by
the secretary of state or other officer in
trust for the state. The Ohio statute in
the case before us belongs to this class,
and the dictum of Judge DRUMMOND,
cited by complainant's counsel, is supported by a decision in New York (Lit-

tIle v. Gould, 2 Blatch. 365), upon a
somewhat similar law, in which it was
held that by paying a salary the state
became entitled to the copyright, as far
as the reporter's own work was concerned.
The Constitution of New York declares
that all judicial decisions .shall be free
for publication by any person-a provision which by taking it away seems to
recognise a right of property in the
state.
On the whole it seems reasonable to
conclude that by paying a compensation
to her judges the state acquires copyright in their decisions, and by express
legislation to that effect may control their
publication.
Both in point of law and as a subject
of literary inquiry the matter of copyright in legal works is interesting. One
reason for this is to be found in the character of legal writing, which offers little
scope for beauty of style or originality,
and draws its materials from common
sources, where it does not levy directly
upon the labor of other authors. The
cases will repay a review in detail.
In Butterworthv. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709,
the proprietors of the " Term Reports"
applied for an injunction to restrain the
sale of an Abridgment of Cases in the
Courts of Law. Except in colorably
leaving out parts, as the arguments of
counsel, the book complained of was a
mere copy of cases in the Term and other
reports. To give the appearance of a
new work the chronological *order of
cases was changed to an alphabetical
one. Lord LouonMonouH said it was
"can extremely illiberal publication,"
and granted an injunction.
In 1838 arose the question of Leading
Cases. (Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne &
Craig 711.) The complainants held the
copyright of several reports which they
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claimed were pirated by vol. 1, part 2
of"Smith's Leading Cases." It was said
that cases had been transferred entire,
and that the work would become a substitute for the regular reports. The injunction was refused, partly on other
grounds, and the parties were remitted
to an action at law to settle the question
of piracy. Lord COTTENUA3t seined to
lean in favor of the defendants, saying
that whether or not there was a piracy
in the present case, the same method had
been employed in other works, in Chitty
on Bills, for instance, where cases taken
from other works were printed at length.
The value of Smith's Leading Cases, he
continued, arose not from the report but
from the laborious and learned .notes for
which the report served as a startingpoint. The same chancellor, in a contest
between two treatises on Passing Bills
through Parliament, declared that piracy
did not depend upon the quantity of
matter taken but its value.
Bramwell
v. Halcomb, 3 Mylne & Craig 737.
In Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. (81 E.
C. L. R.) 459, the "Jurist," which by
a staff of lawyers paid for the service,
reported the current decisions of the
courts, sued the " Monthly Digest," a
digest of current decisions. The former
periodical published head-notes to the
opinions, and the "Monthly Digest"
adopted these verbathn. The majority of
the court held that there was a piracy,
agreeing with JEnvis, C. J., who thought
that each report was in fact double, the
report in full being an expansion of the
head-note. If the short report could be
appropriated, why not the longer ? One
could not avail himself of another's labors
merely by compiling them so as to form a
digest-lie must apply his own brain to
extracting the plinciple of the decision,
and dress it up in his own language.
The case at bar was a mere mechanical
stringing together of notes made by
others. CROWDER, J., concurred with
some hesitation, doubting if the object of
the "Monthly Digest" did not differ from

that of the "Jurist," and whether headnotes could be considered short reports.
MAULE, J., dissented, on the ground
that the Digest had all object different
from that of the Jurist, namely, to assist
those who consulted it in finding cases.
He further held that a head-note, instead
of being a report in brief of the case, was
a statement of the principle decided,
which was not the same as a report. All
the judges admitted that the line to be
drawn in the case between piracy and
not piracy was a difficult one.
In Hodyes v. Welsh, 2 Irish Eq. 266,
Crawford and Dix were the authors of
a series of reports.

The defendant pub-

lished a book, Reports of Cases on Registry of Electors, in which he took from
Crawford and Dix many cases relating
to that subject. In some cases the reports were taken verbatim, in others the
wording was different, one difference
consisting in the fact that the defendant's
head-notes were statements of the principle involved, and the report a condensed one, while in Crawford & Dix's reports the head-notes were what in the
preceding case C. J. JExits called a
report in brief, and the report was more
extended. The defendant always gave
a reference to the report in Crawford &
Dix from which he borrowed. The court
held, that there was no difference in the
rules applicable to a reporter of judicial
proceedings, and a historian, for instance ;
both must use care, often referring to
original documents, and the work of one
might just as well be pirated as that of
the other. Whatever the law might be
as to Treatises, the work complained of
was not a Treatise but a Book of Reports
on a special subject, and it was an infringement, because it took, not a few
cases for illustration, but all the cases on
registry. Nor were they taken for the
purpose of annotation, but without note
or comment. As well might the compiler
of a book of poems take all his matter
bodily from another collection.
That
the defendant's book was a useful one,

526

BANKS v. Ml &NCHESTER.

and made without dishonorable intention,
could not influence the question.
In Banks v. McDivitt, 13 Blatchf.
163, the plaintiffs published a book of
Rules of Practice, with notes of decisions
and references. Afterwards the defendant issued a book of Revised Rules,
copying the citations in plaintiff's book
with additional ones of his own. Most
of his notes were identical in substance
and arrangement with those of the plaintiffs. Si,sAr , J., held that there was
an infringement, it being evident that the
plaintiff's book had been resorted to to
save the time and toil which original investigation would cost. The citations
followed the same order, and the index
was almost a re-print of that in the plaintiff's book.
In Mpers v. Callaghan, referred to in
the text, the defendants published an annotated and condensed edition of Freeman's Illinois Reports. While the woik
gave evidence of independent labor there
were also tokens that Mr. Freeman's
volumes had been freely used-words and
sentences had been copied without change,
sentences had been altered in form only,
and there was a similarity in the arrangement of the two works. Judge DRUtr3tOND decided the second work an infringement, and put the matter as in a
nutshell when he said that it was a dangerous thing to sit down with a copyright
volume of reports before one and try to
make out an independent report, though
this could easily be done by the use of
original sources of information, the records, briefs of counsel and such like.
The judge added that while the paging
and arrangement of a volume might not
of itself amount to piracy it ought to be
taken into account with other matters.
A single case as to Forms: Alexander
v. Mackenzie, 9 Scotch Cr. of Session,
2d series, 748. Alexander published an
Analysis of Certain Real Estate Statutes
with Forms, and afterwards a committee
of the bar prepared a report with forms
subjoined, on the same statutes. It ap-

peared that the statutes gave only vague
and general directions as to the forms to
be used. so that the preparation of suitable forms was a work of skill and labor.
The two sets of-forms were alike not
only in substance but in the very order
of arrangement, though there were some
variances seemingly for variance sake.
Where, for instance, the complainant's
forms had "(insert date)" the defendant's would read " (this -

day of-),"

etc. The court ruled that there was an
infringement, observing that though the
materials from which the work is made
are in mnedio, yet if they are arranged
in new form the work is copyright.
And one of the judges pronounced the
test to be: Did he do the work fairly
and honestly for himself, though he may
occasionally have followed in the vestigia
left by his predecessor ?
As this note is confined to cases of
copyright in legal writing we offer but
one case on the important subject of
Abridgments, namely, Story v. Holcomb,
4 McLean 306, in which Judge Story's
executors restrained an Abridgment of
his Commentaries on the Constitution.
Mr. Justice MCLEAN laid down the
principles that the intent with which the
infringing work was written, however
blameless, was of little consequence; that
a fair abridgment was lawful though
injuring the sale of the original book ;
but that a compilation was not lawful.
He said "To copy certain passages
from a book omitting others is in no
just sense an abridgment of it. It
makes the work shorter but it does not
abridge it. The judgment is not exercised in conserving the views of the author. To abridge is to preserve the substance, the essence of the work, in
language suited to such a purpose. * * *
A compilation consists of extracts from
different authors, an abridgment is a condensation of the views of the author."
No better statement of the nature of an
abridgment than this need be asked.
The question of the ownership of ar-
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ticles in periodicals arose in the Jurist
and Monthly Digest case before mentioned. On that point the judges were
unamimous that when a writer furnished
matter to a periodical and was paid therefor the copyright, unless by special arrangement, belonged to the proprietor of
the publication. We have already seen
that a state reporter paid by salary stands
in this position to the state. (Little v.
Gould, supra.)
One or two cases on Legal Treatises
may be added more as matter of legal
bibliography than as establishing any
new principle. In Sweet v. Cater, 11
Simons 572, equity proceedings were
taken against a book on the Sale and
Conveyance of Real Property, with Precedents, by William Hughes, as being a
piracy of Sugden's well known work on
Vendors and Purchasers. The report of
the case informs us only that the passages
taken were so many and so lengthy as to
constitute a piracy, and that the parties
were remitted to an action at law.
In Archbold v. Sweet, 5 Carr. & P.
219, Mr. Archbold, author of the work
on Pleading and Practice in Criminal
Cases, sold his copyright to a publisher,
who issued an edition without Archbold's
sanction, edited by another hand, full of
errors, but calculated by the appearance
of the title-page to pass for Mr. Archbold's own work. Lord TENTERDEN instructed the jury upon the errors pointed
out, and the not very generous verdict
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of five pounds was rendered for the plaintilT, Mr. Archbold.
Two rules we think may be deduced
from the foregoing review.
1. The work must be independentwe cannot say original-in performance.
The author must draw Lis matter from
original sources, must adopt a plan of
arrangement for himself, and even in the
citation of authorities there must be
something beyond the mechanical labor,
great as that may be, of verifying the
volume and page of references taken
from other works.
2. The work must be independent in
its object. In other words, reference
must be had to the part which works borrowed from bear in the plan of the book.
Here lies the difference between a work
like Smith's Leading Cases, and a collection of decisions on a special topic
or a series of annotated reports. The
design and value of the former work
consists in the notes, to which the
cases borrowed serve but as texts ; the
object of the latter is to make profit out
of the labor of another by putting it into
a more accessible form, or adding to its
instructiveness.
If the work is thus independent it
makes no difference if it supplants the
book upon which it is founded-if it is
not, the usefulness of the book is no excuse for the infringement.
CHRrxs CHAIUNoEY SAVAGE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
WHITE v. MILWAUKEE CITY RAILWAY 00.
In an actiond for personal injuries the court may, in a proper case, at the trial
direct the plaintiff to submit to a personal examination by physicians on behalf of
defendant.
Upon a street railway a separate track was used for the cars going in each direction, and frogs were so placed as to prevent cars, going in the proper direction,
from being thrown from the track while going upon or leaving a switch-bridge. A
loaded wagon having broken down on the bridge upon one of the tracks, a car approaching thereon was necessarily lifted to the other track, and being then driven
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rapidly upon the bridge, was thrown from the track, injuring a passenger. fleld,
that the company was not negligent in not placing frogs so as to prevent a car thus
going in the wrong direction upon the track from being thrown off, but that the
question whether the speed with which the car was driven upon the bridge was not,
under the circumstances, negligent, was for the jury.
To justify the assessment of damages for future or permanent disability, it must
appear that continued or permanent disability is reasonably certain to result from the
iujiLry complained of.

APPEAL from County Court, Milwaukee County.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for
personal injuries alleged to have been received by her through the
negligence of the defendant company, its agents and servants, while
riding in one of its street cars. The facts of the case are briefly
as follows: The defendant operates two tracks of street railway,
running north and south on East Water and Reed streets, in the
city of Milwaukee. These streets abut each other at the Menominee river, and are connected by a swing-bridge across that river
near the Union depot. The tracks are laid upon the bridge. The
west track is used exclusively for cars going south, and the east
track for those going north. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff was a passenger in one of the cars of the defendant going north
on the east track on Reed street, which is the street south of the
river. A loaded wagon had broken down on the bridge and obstructed that track. The car in which the plaintiff was riding was
safely and properly removed to the west track, and just as it was
driven upon the bridge the forward wheels left the track. The jolt
of the car caused thereby threw the plaintiff from her seat, and
caused the injury complained of, which was a bruise of one of her
limbs below the knee. The ends of the rails of the west track on
the south abutment next the bridge were constructed with frogs,
which seem to be nothing more than a widening of the rails at the
ends. There were also frogs on the ends of the rails on the bridge
next the north abutment thereof. The same rail was used on the
east track, the frogs being upon the ends of the rails on the north
abutment, and on the bridge next the south abutment. Thus it
will be seen that whichever way the bridge was turned, the location
of the frogs was the same.
The purpose of these frogs was to
overcome the disturbance of the rail by the swaying of the bridge,
and to keep the car-wheels on the track when they should strike
the bridge or the abutment, although the track might be out of
line. It will thus be seen that no precautions were employed in
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the construction of the tracks with reference to a car running, as
did this car, north on the west track.
The testimony given on the trial tends to show that the car was
being driven rapidly when it jumped the track. In answer to the
question, " What caused said car to, leave the track and strike the
arch of the bridge ?" the jury answered, '1Fast driving, and the
absence of a frog on the west track of the bridge." The jury also
found the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff was not: that
the plaintiff sfistained temporary injury to the right leg, which may
prove permanent, and assessed her damages at $650. A motion
for a.new trial was denied, and judgment entered for the plaintiff
pursuant to the verdict. The defendant appealed from the judgment.
B. K. Adams,, for respondent.

Rogers &' Mann and B. P. Smith, for appellant.
LYON, J.-It is claimed on behalf of the defendant that no
sufficient evidence was given upon the trial to support the finding
that the defendant was guilty of negligence which caused the injuries complained of. We do not think that negligence can be imputed to the defendant by reason of the manner in which it constructed its railway. The track seems to have been laid in the usual
and proper manner, and the frogs placed in the proper positions to
keep the cars upon the track when they passed the bridge. In
view of the direction in which the cars were moved on the respective tracks, it would be unreasonable to require the defendant to
construct its tracks to guard against a contingency such as occurred
in the present case. Moreover, it does not appear that the company, in this respect, has violated any of the requirements of its
charter, or any order or direction of the authorities of the city of
Milwaukee. It is obvious, however, that a car passing north on
the west track from the south abutment to the bridge (as was the
car in question) would be much more liable to leave the track than
one going in the opposite direction on the same track. This fact
would render it the duty of the servants of the defendant in
charge of the car, to exercise more caution to keep the car on the
track, than would be required were it moving in the opposite direction.
Ianifestly the most effectual precaution that could be used
to keep the car on the track, or, at least, to prevent injury to passengers if it left the track, would, be to drive slowly from the abutVOL. XXXIII.-67
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ment of the bridge. The testimony in the case, although conflicting, tends to show that this car was driven rapidly at that point.
Whether moving the car at such a rate of speed was or was not
negligence is peculiarly a question of fact for the jury. The finding in that behalf is supported by the evidence. We conclude,
therefore, that there was no error in submitting the question of
defendant's negligence to the jury, and the verdict on that question
cannot be disturbed.
The testimony of the plaintiff and some of her witnesses
tends to show that at the time of the trial she had not recovered
from the effect of the injuries; that her limb was not then in a
normal condition; and that the effect of such injuries would or
might be permanent. She testified that five physicians had examined her limb, among whom was Dr. Hare. During the trial counsel for the defendant made the following request, and the following
proceedings were thereupon had; "Defendant's Counsel.-We ask
of the court to direct the plaintiff, who is now present, to submit
her limb for examination in a private room attached to the courtroom, privately, to Drs. Senn and Hare, who are now present, and
that if she wish she can be accompanied by any of her own female
friends who are present, or any other physician whom she chooses.
Court.-I do not see anything improper in the request, but I do
not think I have any authority to compel a suitor to submit, in a
case of this kind, to any examination against his or her will; I
therefore refuse the application. (Defendant excepts.) Plaintiff's
counsel says: I The plaintiff herself declines to have the examination
in the absence of her physician, who, as her attorney is informed
and believes, has left the city since he has been on the witness
stand.' "
It will be seen that the court denied this request on the sole
ground that he had no authority to compel the plaintiff to an examination against her will. On principle and authority we are satisfied that this was error. The then condition of the injured limb
had a most important bearing upon the question as to whether the
plaintiff's injuries were permanent, and an examination at that time,
the results of which would have been put in evidence before the
jury, would in all probability have greatly aided them in determining the extent and consequence of the injury. It would, or.might
have been more satisfactory and conclusive evidence on that subject
than the statements of the plaintiff, or the opinions of the medical
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witnesses. The application for her examination contained in it
every reasonable safeguard against offending the modesty or delicacy
of the plaintiff, and although she might shrink from the examination
yet the ends of justice imperatively demanded that she submit to it.
Such examinations are frequently ordered by courts in cases of
divorce for impotency, and in cases of alleged pregnancy, and the
authority of the court to order them has never been questioned, so
far as we are advised.
In Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 384, the power of the court in
a proper case to order a personal examination is asserted, and it is
there said that it rests upon the same principle as does the power to
compel the discovery of books, papers and documents, the difference
being that in a case like this the principle extends to things or substances as well. Schroeder v. Chicago B. 1 & P. By. Co., 47 Iowa
375, is to the same effect. The opinion of BECK, J., in that case,
and of JONES, J., in Walsh v. Sayre, supra, contain very able and
satisfactory discussions of this question. It is said by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff that it rests in the sound discretion of the
court to order or refuse an examination. Perhaps it does. But
that discretion has not been exercised here. The court expressly
denied the application because of alleged want of power to grant it.
We hold that in a proper case the court has power to order an examination, and that this is a proper case in which to exercise it.
It has already been stated that to the question, " What injury
did the plaintiff sustain, if any, by such accident?" the jury answered: " Temporary injury to the right leg, which may prove
permanent." This is but little, if anything, more than a finding
that the injury may possibly be permanent. A mere possible continuance of disability by reason of an injury is not a proper element
of damages. To justify the jury in assessing damages for future
or permanent disability, it must appear by the proofs that continued
or permanent disability is reasonably certain to result from the in-*
jury complained of, It is fair to assume that the jury predicated
their assessment of damages in part upon the possibility of permanent injury. This also is error. Other errors were assigned and
argued by counsel, but as the above views are decisive of the case
it is unnecessary to consider them. The judgment of the county
court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.

532

SIOUX CITY & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. FINLAYSON.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
SIOUX CITY & PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v.FINLAYSON.
It is not error for the court, during the progress of a trial, to refuse to order the
plaintiff, who sues for injuries to his person, to submit to an examination of his person by physicians who are witnesses for the defendant, in the absence of any showing
whatever that justice would be promoted thereby, and especially so when the plaintiff submits to an examination by such witnesses in the presence of the jury.

THIS was an action for damages resulting from a personal injury
caused by the explosion of an engine belonging to defendants. A
number of questions were raised in the case, but only that portion
of the opinion is given which relates to the point referred to in the
syllabus.
L. W. Osborn and Joy, Wright 4 Hudson, for plaintiff.
George W. -Doaneand Ballard . Walton, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REESE, J. (after deciding other questions raised by the case).The record shows that after the defendant in error had introduced
all his testimony on the trial, and had rested his case, the "defendant (plaintiff in error) moved the court to direct the plaintiff to
allow the physicians, called on the part of the defence, to make an
examination of his person with reference to his alleged injuries for
which he now seeks to recover. The court ruled that it had no
power to make such an order; to which ruling defendant excepts."
Error is assigned in this court based upon this record. If such
examination was proper to be made, and if the defendant in error,
upon application bad refused to allow it to be done, we are inclined
to believe the court had the power to make and enforce such an
order. It is fundamental that, if a decision or ruling of a court is
correct, the fact that the reason assigned therefor by the court,
when making it, is not sufficient to sustain the order; the fact of
such deficient reason being given will not vitiate the ruling or order.
The question now before us is, did the court err in its refusal to
is not the province
make the order requested ? We think not. 1:t
orders
simply because
useless
and'
unnecessary
of courts to make
they are so requested. There was -no showing made to the court
that permission to make the examination had been refused by defend-
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ant in error, nor that any such permission had been requested.
There is no showing of any kind that such examination was necessary in order to aid defendant in error in making its defence; indeed
there was no intimation made that any good could possibly result or
benefit be derived from such an examination. The request was made
in the midst of the trial. The court was asked to stop the trial
and send out the plaintiff in the suit for examination. Again, this
request hardly possessed all the elements of fairness. The court
was asked to virtually place the defendant in error in the hands of
the defence. It was not sought to have the examination made by
disinterested and unbiased surgeons whom the parties might select
or the court appoint, but by the "physicians called upon the part
of the defence." Again, the record shows that, when the witnesses
on the part of the defence were placed upon the stand to testify
upon the question of the alleged injury, the defendant in error was
asked to "step forward and allow the witness to examine him;"
which he did.
The record further shows that the defendant in error was "asked
to remove his coat and vest, which he does, and the witness examines the back, sides, and other portions of the body of the plaintiff,
also as to his breathing; also the condition of his eyes, the muscles
of the leg, the condition of the tongue and of the pulse." From
this it would seem that even if the court had erred by its refusal to
make the order, that error was cured by the examination made by
consent of defendant in error. The only case cited by plaintiff in
error in support of his position is Schrceder v. C., B. I. & P. 1?.
Co., 47 Iowa 375. But there is a wide distinction between that
case and this. In that case the request was made after the jury
was impanelled, but before any of the testimony was heard. The
application was in writing, and requested the examination to be made
by a "proper number of physicians to be selected, in equal numbers
by plaintiff and defendant, and it was proposed by defendant that
its own medical officer should not be one of the number; * * *
and in support of this application the affidavit of a surgeon and
physician in.the employment of defendant was filed, stating that he
had professionally attended plaintiff immediately after he was injured, and had made personal observation of plaintiff's condition,
and had heard his testimony at the former trial, and it was his belief,
based upon these means of knowledge, that his injuries were not
of the character claimed by him, and that the truth of the matter
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could be ascertained by a proper personal examination of plaintiff." It also appears in that case that an effort was made to procure an examination of plaintiff in the presence of the jury, as
was done in this case, but the plaintiff refused to submit to it, and
the court would not order it; and that, too, after the plaintiff had
testified that his back and internal organs were affected by the injury, and " that one of his legs was disabled to an extent that
deprived him of its full use, and that he thought it appeared to be
smaller and somewhat shrunken." Our attention has been called
to no other case upon this subject, and we know of no other holding
as the Iowa case. As to the soundness of the position taken by
that court we have nothing to say. The question is not before us.
It is enough to say that under the authority of that case it cannot
be made to appear that the ruling of the court in this case was
erroneous, or that it abused its discretion in refusing to make the
order sought.
The next question presented by plaintiff in error is that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence. With the
exception hereafter noticed, we cannot agree with the counsel for
plaintiff in error. We have already in some degree discussed the
evidence and facts of the case, and the length of the record must
prevent any further discussion thereof. We have carefully examined the record, and conclude the evidence will sustain a verdict for
defendant in error. The last matter presented for consideration is
that the verdict is excessive. To this proposition we assent. The
testimony shows that at the time he received the injury the defendant in error was about 25 years of age. While the testimony of
the physicians leave it in doubt as to his final and complete recovery,
it appears that at the time of the trial he had so far recovered from
his injury as to be engaged in business, and to be able to devote
most of his time thereto. The injury is defined and described by
the physicians as concussion of the spinal cord, by which a diseased or abnormal condition of the nervous system is produced,
affecting his general health to some extent, and depriving him of
the ability to engage in active physical labor, and perhaps rendering
him unfit to engage in his buiness as railroad engineer. He has
retained his mental faculties to their full extent. At times he is
free from pain; at others he has a soreness and pain in his back.
There was no laceration of any part of his body, no fracture of any
bones. There is supposed to be no injury to the bones of his
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spinal column. The physical or visible evidences have disappeared,
and some of the physicians give it as their opinion that there will
ultimately be a substantial but perhaps not a complete recovery.
Believing that the verdict is excessive, the judgment and decision
of this court is that the judgment of the District Court be set aside
and a new trial granted, unless the defendant in error enter a
rernittiturof the sum of $3000 within 80 days from this date. If
such renzittitur is filed, the judgment, to the extent of $6260, will
be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
To one who considers the question,
either upon principle or authority, it seems
surprising that it should ever have been
doubted that, as held in the principal case
of White v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co., in
an action for personal injuries, the court
may, in a proper case, direct the plaintiff to submit to a personal examination
by physicians on behalf of the defendant.
The maxim, "believe half what you see
and a twentieth part of what you hear,"
makes a comparison not altogether unjust between the value of evidence addressed primarily to the senses and parol
testimony as ordinarily introduced in our
courts of justice. "In judicial proceedings the judge or jury can seldom act
entirely upon evidence of this description
[addressed to the senses], though, when
pregnancy is pleaded, a jury of matrons
is empowered to decide the issue upon
examination of the person of the prisoner;
but in a vast number of instances, especially where the fact in dispute is sought
to be proved by circumstantial evidence,
the verdict will be found to rest materially upon matters submitted to the ocular inspection of the jury :" 1 Taylor
554 ; Baynon Ev. (7th London ed.)
ton's Case, 14 Now. St. Pr. 630, 631,
634; 1 Hale 368; 2 Id. 413; Reg. v.
Tpyc erly, 8 C. & P. 262. In the last
case, decided in 1838, the practice in such
cases is described. The matrons in this
case having desired the assistance of a
surgeon, it was decided that they should
return into the court room . the surgeon

was directed to retire and examine the
prisoner, and upon his return was sworn
and examined as an ordinary witness in
open court. See, also, I Bish. Crim.
Proc.
1323 ; State v. Arden, I Bay
487.
The practice in suits to declare a marriage null on the ground of impotence
will be found in 2 Bish. Crim. Proc.
590, from which it appears that it is settled law, both in England and the United
States, to order an inspection of the person in such cases. See Deranbagh v.
Devanbagh, 5 Paige 554; Le Barron v.
Le Barren, 35 Vt. 365 ; Anon., 35 Ala.
226.
Another ease in which inspection of
the person was the established practice
was upon appeals of mayhem. "When
upon an appeal of mayhem, the issue
joined is whether it be mayhem or no
mayhem, this shall be decided by the court
upon inspection, for which purpose they
may call in the assistance of surgeons :"
3 BI. Com. 332 ; 2 Rolle's Abr. 578.
Although appeals of mayhem are obsolete, the ancient practice in such cases
may well be cited to show the general
spirit and methods of the common law
where an examination of the person is
necessary to advance the interests of
justice.
Cases holding that a prisoner accused
of crime cannot be compelled to submit
to an examination of his or her person
when the results of such examination
might furnish evidence against himself or
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herself, do not militate against the position of the principal case, on account of
the constitutional provision that no person shall he compelled in any criminal

St. Paul ,J- D. Rd. Co., 22 Id. 176, recently decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, may also be read with profit.

case to he a witness against himself. See

for personal injuries, it was held that the
court has power in a proper case and
under proper circumstances to require
the plaintiff to perform a physical act
in the presence of the jury, that will show
the nature and extent of his injuries, but
that the propriety of doing so in a given
case rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court. In this case the uncontradicted
evidence of a number of witnesses showed
that since receiving the injury complained
of the plaintiff was lame and "limped"
when she walked ; and it was held that
the court committed no error in refusing
to require her to walk across the court
room in the presence of the jury. In
delivering the opinion of the court,

People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216.
The well-considered cases of T dsh v.
Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334 ; and &hrader
v. The Chicago, R. 1. 4 P. Rd. Co., 47
Iowa 375, are the only cases with which
we are acquainted, besides the principal
cases, bearing directly upon the point in
question ; and if any authority were necessary, these would seem to be conclusive upon the question. We do not believe the doctrine of these cases can ever
be successfully controverted, founded as
they are upon the soundest reason and
being necessary to the interests of justice.
MARSHALL D.

EWELL.

Chicago.

In the latter case, which was an action

MITCHELL,

Since the foregoing note was written
the Supreme Court of Nebraska has
again passed upon the question involved
in the principal case of Sionx City 4. P.
R.R. Co. v. Rinlayson, and has adhered to
that decision : Stuart v. Rlavens, 22 N.
W. Rep. 419. The case of Hatfield v.

J., referred to the case of

Schrs-der v.'6Chicago, 4'c., R. R. Co., and
conceded the correctness of the principle
contended for in the above note. Upon
the whole no reason appears why we
should change the opinion already above
stated.
M. D. E.

Supreme Court of TVermont.
WELLS v. TUCKER.
'Where a sale is made of land, separate portions of which are subject to separate
mortgages, and the vendee as part of the price assumes the payment of said mortgages, and subsequently the vendor is compelled to pay one of them, the vendee cannot maintain a bill against the vendor to redeem the land from such mortgage without also paving the other mortgage.
BILL IN EQUITY. Defendant Tucker, owning a farm on each
undivided half of which rested separate mortgages given by him,
conveyed the same to defendant Wells, the deed referring to said
mortgages, describing the notes thereby secured, and stating that
" said Wells assumed the payment of said notes agreeably to their
tenor, and to save the said Tucker harmless and indemnified therefrom ;" and the amount due on said mortgage was recktoned as
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a part of the purchase-money. Wells accepted said deed, and went
into possession under it; and on May 1st 1881, conveyed his equity
of redemption to his mother, who now, with his wife who claimed
an estate of homestead, filed this bill to redeem one of said mortgages as against Tucker who had been compelled to pay it, without
redeeming the other. The master found that the trade for the farm
"was all one trade," and the assumption of the mortgages "all one
assumption."
J. P. Lamson and S. C. Shurtleff, for complainants.
J. A. &' Geo. IW. F-ing, for defendant Tucker.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROWELL, J.-By accepting the deed from Tucker and going into
possession under it, Wells assumed and agreed to pay both mortgages as a part of the purchase-money, and to save Tucker harmless
and indemnified therefrom. As between Tucker and Wells, Wells
thereby became primarily liable for the payment of said mortgages, and Tucker became his surety therefor, and the land became
the primary fund out of which payment was to be made. It is
clear, Wells failing to pay as he agreed, that Tucker could pay and
be subrogated in equity to the mortgage security; but this is not
the only effect of Wells's agreement. By it the two mortgages were
consolidated and made one as to Wells and all persons claiming
under him, and the burden of each was annexed to, and made to rest
upon the whole land; and this, not because the lien of each was
thereby actually extended over the whole land, but because of the
contract itself, which equity takes cognisance of, and will enforce
in favor of Tucker as against Wells and all persons standing in his
stead.
The case of Welch v. Beers, 8 Allen 151, is full authority for
this view, and was thus: Prescott held a mortgage for $500 on a
whole tract of land, and had taken possession to foreclose. After
the making of the mortgage, the mortgagor conveyed a part of the
tract, with an agreement recited in the deed, that the grantee
assumed and was to pay the whole of the mortgage as a part of
the purchase-money. Afterwards the mortgagor conveyed the
remainder of the tract to the plaintiff in fee, not covenanted
against the mortgage, but with an express understanding that it
was to be paid in fall by the prior purchaser. Prescott subseVoL. XXXIII.=-68
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quently took a new mortgage of the first part for $1200, with full
knowledge of said agreement, and the value of that part was more
than enough to pay the $500 mortgage. Held, that the plaintiff's
part of the land was exempt from said last-mentioned mortgage,
not because his deed of warranty left the whole burden of it to rest
upon the other part, but because said agreement expressly annexed
it to such part before the plaintiff purchased.
This is very analogous to the rule in equity, that when land
subject to mortgage is sold by the mortgagor in separate parcels to
different purchasers, without an assumption by them of any part
of the mortgage debt, and the deeds are duly recbrded, or actual
notice is had of the state of the title and the subsisting equities, the
purchasers, as between themselves, are charged, and must contribute in the inverse order of the time of their purchases. This
rule rests upon the ground, that when a mortgagor sells a part of
the mortgaged premises without reference to the incumbrance, it is
right, as between him and the purchaser, that the part still held by
him should be first applied to the payment of the debt, and so
equity charges it with such payment. But this is not, as was said
in Welch v. Beers, because a deed of warranty of part, of itself,
directly creates a lien on the remainder for the whole amount of
the mortgage, but because equity recognises the mortgagor's contract as binding on subsequent purchasers who take with notice
thereof.
So here, it is right as between Tucker and Wells, that Wells
should pay both mortgages before holding any part of the farm free
from either; and a court of equity would not aid him, as against
Tucker, to redeem one of them only, and thus enable him to hold
an undivided half of the farm free from both, for this would be contrary to the spirit of his agreement, and he who seeks equity must
do equity. And the complainants have no better right than Wells
himself had, for they sit in his seat.
Decree affirmed and cause remanded.

